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Modalizing Mechanisms*
We have some epistemic access to the appearance of things. There is no 
problem in principle with the notion that the states of a bodily mechanism (our 
perceptual apparatus, in particular) might be attuned to (carry information 
about) the appearance of things.1 We also have some epistemic access to so-
called modal facts -- facts whether something is possible or impossible, likely or
unlikely, regardless of whether actual or not. In Peter Van Inwagen2's turn of 
phrase, we are able to modalize. This, on the other hand, is usually taken to be 
puzzling. In particular, it is often deemed unhelpful to model our epistemic 
access to the modal realm on the basis of perception, and postulate the 
existence of a bodily mechanism attuned to modal features of the world. Thus, 
Yablo’s endorsement of the claim that "it is unclear how such a mechanism 
could work even in principle";3 and Peacocke’s claim that the attuned-
mechanism route amounts to the postulation of “dubiously intelligible faculties 
connecting the thinker with some modal realm”.4
The fact that many theorists look askance at modalizing mechanisms probably 
helps explain the prevalence5 of neo-rationalist approaches in contemporary 
epistemology of modality. In these approaches, mechanistic attunement is 
substituted, among other choices, by a suitably constrained faculty of 
conceiving,6 or by truth-tracking conditions on concept possession and 
understanding.7 Bueno and Shalkowski8 offer an empiricist alternative to this 
neo-rationalist mainstream but, in their account too, modal knowledge, and, in 
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aside.
2“Modal Epistemology,” Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 67–84.
3 Stephen Yablo, “Is conceivability a guide to possibility?” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 53, no. 1 (1993): 4. Yablo qualifies his acceptance of this claim: "[t]aken in a suitably 
flat-footed way, [it is] true enough" (op. cit). I will be defending that it is false in the suitably flat-
footed sense.
4Christopher Peacocke, Being Known (Oxford University Press, 1999), 163. 
5Pointed out recently by Otàvio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, “Modalism and Theoretical 
Virtues: Toward an Epistemology of Modality,” Philosophical Studies 172 (2015): 671–89. 
6Yablo, “Is conceivability a guide to possibility?”; David Chalmers,  “Does Conceivability Entail 
Possibility?“ in eds. Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility 
(Oxford University Press, 2002). 
7Peacocke, Being Known; George Bealer, “A Theory of the A Priori,” Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly, no. 81 (2000): 1–30. 
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particular, knowledge of probabilities, depends on the presence of moderately 
sophisticated cognitive abilities, by means of which epistemic subjects can 
access the "underlying probability space" and thereby "draw appropriate 
inferences".9
It is unlikely that modal knowledge essentially depends on reasoning of this sort
-- let alone on concept-possession conditions or faculties of conceiving of the 
sort appealed to by neo-rationalists -- if only because we know that mice10 and 
monkeys11 are able to estimate probabilities12 "in approximately optimal 
ways",13 and this suggests that the neural mechanisms associated with this 
ability are "phylogenetically ancient".14
In this paper I show that there is no problem in principle with the idea of 
mechanisms becoming attuned to modal features of the world. I present and 
discuss a decision-theoretic model in which agents with severely limited 
cognitive abilities, at the end of an evolutionary process, have states which 
encode substantial information about the probabilities with which the 
outcomes of a certain Bernoulli process15 occur. Thus, in the model, a process 
driven by very simple, thoroughly naturalistic mechanisms eventuates in modal
sensitivity. This result should help alleviate empiricist scruples about modality 
in general, and encourage philosophical exploration of the quasi-perceptual, 
mechanistic aspects of modal sensitivity.
Section I introduces the main idea, and describes the model in some detail. 
Sections II and III present and discuss some key results: in section II, the 
rationally optimal (i.e., payoff-maximizing) decision for agents in the model is 
discussed. It will turn out that optimal decisions depend systematically on the 
probabilities associated with a certain Bernoulli process: the rational agent 
9Ibid., 682. 
10Fuat Balci, David Freestone, and Charles R. Gallistel, “Risk Assessment in Man and Mouse,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116, no. 7 (2009); Aaron Kheifets and Charles R.
Gallistel, “Mice Take Calculated Risks,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109, no. 
22 (2012). 
11Tianming Yang and Michael N. Shadlen, “Probabilistic Reasoning by Neurons,” Nature 447 
(2007): 1075–82. 
12I am assuming, here and throughout the paper, that (objective) probability is a modality in 
the relevant sense. This usage is reasonably standard (take, for example and from opposite ends 
of the philosophical spectrum, Peter Van Inwagen, “Why Is There Anything at All?” in Ontology, 
Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 57–72; and 
Nora Berenstain and James Ladyman, “Ontic Structural Realism and Modality,” in ed. Elaine M. 
Landry, Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality, (Springer, 2012), 149–65) but, 
should the reader take issue with it, hopefully the following will strike her as plausibly true: if 
something has nonzero probability, it is possible. Therefore, being sensitive (in the 
informational sense) to nonzero probabilities amounts to being sensitive to possibility.
13Charles R. Gallistel et al., “The Perception of Probability,” Psychological Review 121, no. 1 
(2014): 96. 
14Kheifets and Gallistel, “Mice Take Calculated Risks,” 8776. 
15A Bernoulli process is, roughly, one with two possible outcomes, that occur with probability p
and 1-p  respectively.
must, then, show modal sensitivity. Fully rational agents, on the other hand, are 
of limited interest for our current purposes. Section III shows that boundedly 
rational "agents" following blindly a prefixed strategy, after an evolutionary 
process, approximate the optimal decision discussed in section II.
As an illustration of how models of this sort can be brought to bear on 
contemporary discussions in the epistemology of modality, section IV briefly 
examines Williamson's16 naturalistic argument for counterfactualism. Section V 
offers some conclusions.
I. THE MODEL
I have suggested above that worries about the coherence of modalizing 
mechanisms might have been an important motivation in the development of 
neo-rationalist accounts in the epistemology of modality. A first step in the 
defense of such mechanisms is to note that sensitivity to the ways certain 
events might (but also might not) unfold can substantially impact the survival 
prospects of an agent, and hence be selected for. One important way in which it
is good to keep an eye on alternative possible courses of events is when hedging
one's bets with respect to these ways has a higher expected payoff than fully 
committing oneself to one of the alternatives.17
Bet-hedging is extremely common in nature, and has been widely studied: 
plants,18 insects19 or birds20 hedge their bets in various ways. For a simple 
example of bet-hedging,21 consider trade-offs between egg size and number of 
eggs in a clutch. If it is certain that the weather is going to be bad in the 
following year, laying one or two big eggs is the right thing for birds to do: a bird 
hatched from a bigger egg has better possibilities of survival, and it is sensible 
to make sure that at least one or two manage to pull through. On the other 
hand, if it is certain that the weather will be benign, a larger clutch, with smaller
eggs, should be risked: it can be hoped that chicks will do all right anyway, as 
food is abundant when the weather is good, and there will be more of them. If it 
16The Philosophy of Philosophy (Wiley-Blackwell, 2007). 
17In fact, bet-hedging strategies with lower expected payoff can be selected for, if the payoff 
variance is also lower (Tom Philippi and Jon Seger, “Hedging One’s Evolutionary Bets, Revisited,”
Trends in Ecology & Evolution 4, no. 2 (1989): 41–44.) In the model to be presented in the sequel, 
bet-hedging has higher expected payoff than alternative courses of action.
18Dylan Z. Childs, C. J. E. Metcalf, and Mark Rees, “Evolutionary Bet-Hedging in the Real World: 
Empirical Evidence and Challenges Revealed by Plants,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B 207, 
no. 1697 (2010): 3055–64. 
19Yukio Yasui, “Female Multiple Mating as a Genetic Bet-Hedging Strategy When Mate Choice 
Criteria Are Unreliable,” Ecological Research 16 (2001): 605–16. 
20Helen Olofsson, Jörgen Ripa, and Niclas Jonzén, “Bet-Hedging as an Evolutionary Game: The 
Trade-Off Between Egg Size and Number,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B 276 (2009): 2963–
69. 
21Taken from ibid. 
is uncertain whether weather will be good or bad, it often pays to follow the 
few-big-eggs strategy in some clutches and the many-small-eggs strategy in 
some others. Particular egg-laying profiles along these lines will be caused by, 
and carry information about, the fact that good- and bad-weather years occur 
with certain probabilities.
In the model to be presently described, the Monster Hunt, agents hedge their 
bets based on the probability associated with a certain Bernoulli process, and 
this increases their fitness. This is how modal sensitivity evolves.
The Monster Hunt
A certain kind of creature (we will call them hunters) makes a living out of 
hunting for monsters. These monsters come in two types: air and sea monsters, 
both of which develop, Pokémon-style, from the same prior, inchoate stage. 
That is: monsters start their lives in the inchoate stage and, after a short time, 
they change into their final air- or sea-monster form. The transition from 
inchoate to sea-or-air monster is indeterministic; and the probabilities of the 
two outcomes are Pair  and P sea=1−Pair .
Hunters are able to see the type of the monster they are dealing with (sea, air, or 
inchoate); they then must do one of three acts: i) launching a sea attack, ii) 
launching an air attack, and iii) preparing, with a certain investment policy, for 
the eventuality of an ulterior attack. A strategy is a function that takes each of 
the three monster types to a probability distribution over the acts.
The only way to hunt an air (sea) monster is to launch an air (sea) attack, and 
the baseline benefit of a hunt is 10 payoff units. But the hunter can increase this
payoff, if they have prepared for the right kind of attack. A preparation act takes 
the following form: the hunter splits 1 payoff unit into two parts -- e.g., 0.5/0.5, 
or 0.8/0.2. The first (second) fraction is invested in improving the prospects of 
an ulterior air (sea) attack, which will have a payoff that depends on the 
preparation investment through an inverted exponential, diminishing-returns 
function. In particular, the payoff of a "prepared" air attack22 is
20− 10
e2 invair
 (Equation 1)
where inv air  is the fraction invested in the eventuality of an air attack. Mutatis
mutandis for the payoff of a prepared sea-attack and inv sea=1−invair . That is, 
if the hunter's investment policy is 0.5/0.5, then the payoff of both a prepared 
air attack and a prepared sea attack is 20−10e−1=16 .32 . If their investment 
policy is 0/1 then the payoff of an air attack is 10, that of a sea attack is 18.6. Fig. 
22If it is launched against an air monster – air attacks against sea monsters have payoff zero. I 
omit this proviso in what follows.
1 shows the dependence of payoff on preparation investment for all values 
between 0 and 1.
I will use "Prepare( inv air )" to refer to the act of preparation in which the 
investment in the eventuality of an inchoate monster developing to air monster 
is inv air . The decision problem is played in one round -- the hunter sees a 
monster, acts, and the payoff is collected -- unless, in the first round, the hunter 
spots an inchoate monster and chooses to prepare. In that case, we wait until 
the monster has evolved, and play a second round: the hunter sees the monster 
type, acts, and the payoff is collected.
The full payoff matrix for the Monster Hunt is given in Tables 1 and 2: Table 1 
gives the payoffs if the game is over in the first round. Table 2 gives the payoffs if
there is a second round.
Figure
1: Payoff vs. investment in preparation
Table 1: First round payoffs
Air Attack Sea Attack Prepare( inv air )
Air Monster 20− 10
e0
=10 0 -1
23
Sea Monster 0 20− 10
e0
=10 -1
Inchoate Monster 0 0 Play 2nd round
Table 2: Second round payoffs
Air Attack Sea Attack Prepare( inv air )
Air Monster 20− 10
e2 invair
−1 -1 -2
Sea Monster -1 20− 10
e2 (1−inv air )
−1 -2
This payoff structure is set up so as to make bet-hedging increase the fitness of 
hunters. If a hunter encounters an inchoate monster, and refrains from 
attacking straight away but prepares instead, then by the time the monster has 
evolved, a successful prepared attack will have a higher payoff than a successful 
unprepared attack would have otherwise had.
II. PAYOFF-MAXIMIZING STRATEGIES IN THE 
MONSTER HUNT
The Monster Hunt has 3 states {Air Monster, Sea Monster, Inchoate Monster}; 
and infinitely many acts (air and sea attacks, plus one act of preparation per 
each possible value of inv air , i.e., all reals between zero and one.) What's the 
payoff-maximizing strategy for the hunter facing this decision problem? If she is
seeing an air (sea) monster, she should launch an air (sea) attack -- this will get 
her 10 or more payoff units, and any other choice has zero payoff. If she is 
seeing an inchoate monster, launching any kind of attack has zero payoff. It is 
23The -1 and -2 sprinkled throughout the payoff tables keep track of the payoff units that have 
been invested in preparation.
easy to show that she should prepare, by letting inv air  depend on the 
probability of air-monster development, Pair , in the following way:
inv air=
1
2
+ 1
4
ln ( probair1− probair )  (Equation 2)
In fact, the hunter cannot always invest in the way advised by Equation 2:
inv air  cannot take values below 0 and above 1. We arrive at the payoff-
maximizing inv air  by "clipping" inv air :
inv air={ 0 if invair<0invair if 0≤invair≤11 if invair>1  (Equation 3)
A schema of the optimal decision is, thus,
[ InchoateMonster→Prepare ( invair )Air Monster→ Air AttackSea Monster→Sea Attack ]
where inv air  is given by Equation 3. Fig. 2 shows the dependence of 
investment on probability in the optimal decision: it is obvious that inv air  
carries a great deal of information about Pair . In fact, for probabilities 
between 0.12 and 0.88, the optimal investment policy is perfectly informative 
about Pair : we can recover without loss the latter from the former. The 
dependence is, moreover, nearly lineal, which would make the rough-and-
ready policy of using the value of inv air  as an approximator of Pair  a 
reasonably good one. For values of Pair  between 0 and 0.12, or 0.88 and 1,
inv air  provides no information at all about the probabilities with which 
inchoate monsters develop.
It is worth noting that the loss of informational connection between inv air  
and Pair  for very low and very high probabilities is not particular to the payoff
function provided in Equation 1. Wherever payoff depends on investment in a 
way governed by exponentially diminishing returns (i.e., by a formula of the sort
payoff=a−b ⋅e−c ⋅ inv ), the payoff-maximizing investment will tend to minus 
infinity as the probability tends to zero, and to infinity as it tends to one.24 The 
necessary "clipping" to the payoff-maximizing investment will, of course, 
depend on the particular values for a, b, and c, and on the minimum and 
maximum possible investments in the situation at hand.
So, in creatures, if there are any, in which modal sensitivity has actually evolved 
through bet-hedging in the presence of diminishing returns, we should observe 
a systematic loss of precision in the evaluation of extreme probabilities. I do not
claim that the Monster Hunt, or other similar models, are faithful descriptions 
of the way in which modal sensitivity actually comes about -- the model is 
designed to provide a reply to neo-rationalist in-principle rejections of 
24The same thing happens if returns diminish potentially, rather than exponentially.
Figure
2: Payoff-maximizing inv_air per value of P_air
modalizing mechanisms. On the other hand, it should be said that, to the best 
of my knowledge, there is no empirical data against the contention that we are 
systematically worse at estimating very low or very high probabilities -- 
although there is empirical evidence25 that "clipping" should happen below 0.1 
and above 0.9.
III. BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL AGENTS
The foregoing discussion of payoff maximization in the Monster Hunt shows 
how modal sensitivity could possibly come about: rational, payoff-maximizing 
agents are compelled to let their investment policy depend on the probabilities 
with which inchoate monsters evolve -- they will end up encoding probabilities 
as a side effect of their payoff-maximization goals. But this result falls short of a 
response to neo-rationalist worries about modalizing mechanisms, for at least 
two reasons:
First, throughout the previous section we have been dealing with a rational 
payoff maximizer. The neo-rationalist might plausibly rejoin that, sure enough, 
rational agents are modally sensitive, but we knew that already: the main 
rationalistic insight26 is, perhaps, that a non-negligible degree of rationality 
might be a necessary pre-condition of modal sensitivity. Indeed, calculating the 
optimal degree of investment involves equating the derivative of the expected 
payoff to zero, and solving the equation. The cognitive resources needed for this
calculation are not trivial.
Second, a certain strategy might be payoff-maximizing -- and, therefore, under 
a natural mapping of payoff onto fitness, susceptible to being selected for in an 
evolutionary process -- while still be unreachable by evolution, or otherwise out
of bounds for the interested agent. Compare: telekinesis, it is amply shown in 
the X-Men canon, would confer a huge advantage on human mutants; yet it is 
not meant to be.
I now report on the results of a batch of simulations in which a population of 
hunters with severely limited cognitive resources play the Monster Hunt. The 
hunters in this model are "agents" only in the least demanding sense: each of 
them follows a prefixed strategy (a function from states to a probability 
distribution over acts), blindly and without changes throughout their lives. They
do not learn, and have no behavioral flexibility beyond what is afforded by their 
strategy. Still, by the end of a simulation run, a close approximation to the 
payoff-maximizing strategy typically emerges -- and, consequently, hunters in 
the final population snapshot have evolved to encode information, in their 
investment policy, about the probabilities with which inchoate monsters 
25Balci, Freestone and Gallistel, “Risk Assessment in Man and Mouse.”
26Perhaps tacitly shared by empiricists such as Bueno and Shalkowski, “Modalism and 
Theoretical Virtues.” 
develop. This shows, first, that modal sensitivity in no way depends on the 
presence of sophisticated cognitive abilities -- it is in fact a bit of a stretch to 
count hunters' dispositions in the model as cognitive at all -- and, second, that 
modal sensitivity, unlike telekinesis, is within the reach of a straightforward 
evolutionary process.
Simulations are set up as follows: initially, 50 hunters (each of which follows a 
different, random strategy) and 50 monsters are randomly placed on a grid. 
Hunters are paired with the closest monster, and a hunt takes place. When the 
hunt is over, hunters are randomly relocated. The structure of the hunter 
population evolves via a discrete analogue of the replicator dynamics with 
mutation:27 hunters which obtain higher payoffs reproduce more often, 
sometimes hatching an individual with a slighly mutated strategy.28
Simulations are run for each value of Pair  from 0 to 1, at 0.005 increments, 
with 5 different simulations per each such value. In total 201 (values of Pair ) 
times 5 (runs per value) simulations were run (1005 simulations). Modal 
sensitivity evolves systematically: Fig. 3 plots the mean fraction invested in 
preparation for an air attack, inv air , in the hunter population, against the 
probability that an inchoate monster evolves to air monster, Pair  for each of 
these simulations. Pearson's r between Pair  and inv air  (which measures the 
linearity of this dependence) is 0.97 (with p<0.001 ). There is, then, a very 
strong, linear, positive correlation between these two variables -- otherwise 
obvious from Fig. 3.
27Josef Hofbauer and Karl Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 265f. 
28The NetLogo 5.1 model (Uri Wilensky, “Netlogo,” Center for Connected Learning and 
Computer-Based Modeling, 1999) used for this paper, with further implementation details and 
the full source code, can be downloaded from 
https://github.com/manolomartinez/modalizing-mechanisms.
This result vindicates the coherence of (non-rational) modalizing mechanisms: 
in the model, at the end of the simulated evolutionary process, there is a robust 
informational connection between the strategy followed by hunters and a 
genuinely modal feature of their world (the probability associated with 
inchoate-monster development). This connection builds up in an entirely non-
mysterious way -- indeed, in a way that can be specified in perfectly explicit 
terms in 345 lines of code.
It is likely that neo-rationalist misgivings about modalizing mechanisms stem at
least partially from the following combination of views: on the one hand, the 
view that mechanism-based knowledge is causally-based knowledge -- that, for 
example, the existence of perception-based knowledge depends on the fact that
perceptually-knowable states of affairs are able to causally affect our sensory 
organs. And, on the other hand, the view that merely possible states of affairs 
are causally inert -- what has not happened cannot cause anything. As the 
Monster Hunt model shows, one can accept both of these claims and still 
maintain that there can be mechanism-based modal knowledge: the 
Figure
3: Probability of an inchoate monster evolving to air monster vs. the mean 
fraction that hunters invest in preparation for the eventuality of an air attack.
modalizing mechanism need not be causally affected by merely possible states 
of affairs; it can be causally affected, for example, by the presence of an 
indeterministic process, or by reliable evidence thereof. In particular, no hunter 
has ever perceived an inchoate monster evolve both to sea and to air monster, 
but this has not prevented the emergence of investment policies that carry 
information to the effect that both these outcomes are possible, and likely to 
different degrees.
IV. WILLIAMSON'S NATURALISTIC ARGUMENT FOR 
COUNTERFACTUALISM
Williamson29 has developed an influential treatment of the epistemology of 
modality according to which our knowledge that certain propositions are 
metaphysically possible depends on a more basic competence in 
counterfactual reasoning. At various places, Williamson argues in favor of the 
naturalistic credentials of this account, along the following lines:
Far from being sui generis, the capacity to handle metaphysical modality is an “accidental” 
byproduct of the cognitive mechanisms that provide our capacity to handle counterfactual 
conditionals. Since our capacity for modal thinking cannot be isolated from our capacity for 
ordinary thinking about the natural world, which involves counterfactual thinking, skeptics 
about metaphysical modality cannot excise it from our conceptual scheme without loss to 
ordinary thought about the natural world, for the former is implicit in the latter.30
The idea is that one gets epistemic access to the more ambitious metaphysical 
possibilities (involving, perhaps, inverted spectrum scenarios, or Lewisian 
miracle worlds) for free, as a byproduct of an ecologically useful ability to 
evaluate everyday counterfactual situations. I will not take issue here with 
Williamson's suggestion that knowledge of the metaphysical modalities 
depends on a prior ability to counterfactualize,31 but, in any event, Williamson's 
naturalistic argument can be recast in more general terms: first, the 
evolutionary usefulness of our sensitivity to everyday modal facts explains that 
we are so sensitive; second, such sensitivity cannot be excised from a sensitivity 
to more remote modal features of the world; therefore, the evolutionary 
usefulness of our sensitivity to everyday modal facts explains that we are 
sensitive to more remote modal features of the world.
29The Philosophy of Philosophy, chap. 5. 
30Ibid., 162. 
31But, as I pointed out in the introduction, we have good empirical evidence that knowledge of 
probabilities is phylogenetically very old. Thus, it deserves investigation as a likely precursor of 
our knowledge of possibilities -- at least a crude version of the latter could be derived from the 
former via a principle such as Something is possible if there is a time at which it has nonzero 
probability.
The models discussed in this paper vindicate the first premise in this argument: 
they describe a situation in which sensitivity to everyday modal facts is 
evolutionarily useful for a certain agent. They also provide a mechanisn -- bet 
hedging in the presence of reliable evidence of an indeterministic process -- by 
which such a useful ability could be had.
On the other hand, they also show the second premise in Williamson's 
argument to be false in general: sensitivity in the Monster Hunt is perfectly 
excised from any and all modal features that are not of immediate concern to 
hunters. It is, of course, possible that human agents are different from monster 
hunters, and that our modalizing ability has the kinds of inextricable ties to the 
modally remote that Williamson envisages. But, the model shows, this cannot 
be simply assumed. It should rather be argued for, precisely by first identifying, 
then probing, the mechanism by which everyday modalizing is done.
V. CONCLUSION
The Monster Hunt model provides, pace Yablo, a proof of possibility for 
mechanisms attuned to the modal aspects of reality, and does so in a way that is
empirically well motivated. In a nutshell: agents in the model find it useful to 
encode modal information because this is the way to maximize expected 
payoff, in an bet-hedging scenario with diminishing returns on investment. 
Furthermore it is possible for them to encode modal information because they 
have epistemic access to evidence that an indeterministic process is about to 
occur -- in the model, evidence that an inchoate monster is about to develop to 
its final stage. The conditions under which modal sensitivity evolves (bet 
hedging, diminishing returns, etc.) are, to be sure, specific, but by no means 
contrived -- we have seen that there appear to be many instances of similar 
conditions in the natural world. On the other hand, I do not claim that this 
must be the way modal sensitivity has evolved; alternative routes are in all 
likelihood possible.
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